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NOTES
SOME POST-DEFERRAL CONSIDERATIONS PROMPTED
BY THE NLRB'S NEW COLLYER DOCTRINE
The perplexing problem of concurrent jurisdiction over labor disputes involving conduct which may be characterized as an unfair labor
practice as well as a breach of contract has provided fertile ground for
debate among legal commentators for several years.1
Traditionally, it had been thought that jurisdiction over unfair labor
practices was vested exclusively in the National Labor Relations Board.
This belief finds firm support in the language of the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA),2 wherein Congress empowered the Board to
decide unfair labor practice controversies.3 Section 10(a) of the NLRA
seems to enunciate a clear congressional intent to confer such jurisdiction solely on the Board. 4
Subsequent to the enactment of the Wagner Act, however, Congress
has expressed an equally clear preference for the utilization of private
arbitration procedures in settling labor disputes.5 The arbitration proc1. See, e.g., Dunau, ContractualProhibition of Unfair Labor Practices: jurisdictional
Problems, 57 Coivum. L. REv. 52 (1957); Lev & Fishman, Suggestions to Management:
Arbitration v. the Labor Board, 10 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 763 (1969); Note, Jurisdiction of Arbitrators and State Courts Over Conduct Constituting Both a Contract
Violation and an Unfair Labor Practice, 69 HARv. L. R~v. 725 (1956).
2. The Wagner Act, 49 Star. 449 (1935), as amended by the Taft-Hartley Act, 61
Stat. 136 (1947), comprise the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-88 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as NLRA].
3. Unfair labor practices are enumerated in section 8 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158
(1970). Included are five types of employer conduct and seven kinds of union activity
that are violative of the Act.
4. Section 10(a) provides in pertinent part:
The Board is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to prevent any person
from engaging in any unfair labor practice . . . affecting commerce. This
power shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention
that has been or may be established by agreement, law, or otherwise: Provided, That the Board is empowered by agreement with any agency
of any State or Territory to cede to such agency jurisdiction over [certain
cases].
29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1970).
5. In section 203(d) of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), it was
stated that:
Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is declared to
be the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over
[ 824 1
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ess has come to be regarded as the appropriate forum for settlement
of contractual grievances between employers and unions.6
As labor unions grew and the collective bargaining process assumed a
more significant role in labor-management relations, collective bargaining
agreements became more complex and expansive. Today, collective
agreements embrace more than economic rights of workers and employers. Additionally, they provide certain standards of conduct that
are designed to regulate both parties to the agreement. 7 Frequently, the
contractual agreements regarding conduct are motivated by the same
interests which gave rise to section 8 of the NLRA, s which outlaws
certain activities as unfair labor practices. Typically, the agreements
also provide that the parties shall submit to final binding arbitration to
resolve grievances which arise under the contract.
With the advent of such expansive agreements, it has become common
for aggrieved parties to file unfair labor practice charges with the Board0
based upon conduct which would also amount to a contract breach.'
Ii these situations, the Board is burdened with the following dilemma:
If the disputes concerning conduct and economic interests are inextricably bound together," it is logical and desirable that both issues be
the application or interpretation of an existing collective bargaining agreement.....
29 U.S.C. § 173 (d) (1970).
6. See generally WrrsoN, LABOR LAW HANBOOn j 501-09 (1963).
7. Most modem collective agreements include conduct provisions designed to ensure
compliance with relevant economic provisions in the contract. For example, most contracts contain specific provisions concerning wages and employee workloads. To ensure
that the employer does not attempt to obviate the contractual economic provisions,
unions typically negotiate for a clause providing that the employer will not institute
modified wage plans without the consent of the union.
8. A contract provision prohibiting unilateral modification of economic matters, for
example, would usually afford unions the same protection intended by section 8(a) (5)
of the NLRA. Note, then, that a breach of the contract provision might also amount
to a violation of section 8.
9. "Grievance arbitration continues to expand quantitatively, aided by the ever-enlarging scope and complexity of day-to-day problems of labor contract administration
and the trend toward longer agreements." FEDRAL MEDIATION AND CoNcmiIo
SERvICE, 19TH ANNuAL REPoRT, FisCAL YEAR 1966, at 4, cited in Samoff, Arbitration,
Not NLRB Intervention, 18 LAB. L.J. 602, 604 (1967), where the author states that
during one recent 26-year period, 94 percent of all collective bargaining agreements included grievance arbitration provisions.
10. See, e.g., Hercules Motor Corp, 136 N.L.R.B. 1648, 50 L.R.R.M. 1021 (1962);
Crown Zellerbach Corp., 95 N.L.RB. 753, 29 L.R.R.M, 1357 (1951); John W. Bolton &
Sons, Inc., 91 N.L.R.B. 989, 26 L.R.R.M. 1598 (1950); Rieke Metal Prods. Corp., 40
N.L.R.B. 867, 10 L.R.R.M. 82 (1942).
11. Where the complaint is divisible-i.e., the economic dispute is separable from the
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resolved by the same forum, but which of the available forums should
hear the controversy? The Board must decide whether to hear the
matter itself-and thereby ignore the stated desire of the parties to arbitrate their grievancesu-or defer to arbitration in which case the arbi-

trator would be urged to rule on the alleged unfair labor practice, which
ostensibly is precluded by section 10 (a) of the NLRA.' 3
The Board has been criticized for its failure to enunciate clear guidelines regarding the resolution of this troublesome problem.' 4 Decisions
involving concurrent jurisdiction in the past 15 years have evidenced a
noticeable trend toward Board deferral to the arbitral forum; 15 this
trend has not been without exception,"' however, and explicit standards
as to which situations would compel deferral have not evolved.
It appears now, however, that the Board is prepared to deal directly
with the problem in an effort to establish its clear preference for deferral to private arbitration procedures.' 7 In Joseph Schlitz Brewing
unfair labor practice allegation-the Board has exercised its own jurisdiction to decide
the unfair labor practice issues while remitting the parties to available arbitration for
settlement of the economic controversy. See, e.g., United Elec. Workers v. Worthington
Corp., 236 F.2d 364 (1st Cir. 1956), rev'g 136 F. Supp. 31 (D. Mass. 1955). Accord, Post
Publishing Co. v. Cort, 334 Mass. 199, 134 N.E.2d 431 (1956).
12. See United Tel. Co. of the West, 112 N..R.B. 779, 782, 36 L.R.R.M. 1097, 1099
(1955), where the Board said: "The Board is not the proper forum for parties seeking
to remedy an alleged breach of contract or to obtain specific enforcement of its terms."
In so ruling, the Board cited the Supreme Court's opinion in Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 348 US. 437, 443 n.2 (1955).
13. Arbitrators are not empowered to interpret section 8 or any other statutory law.
Furthermore, many arbitrators refuse to look beyond the contract in controversy.
Consequently, even attorney-arbitrators may feel as one arbitrator felt when he said:
"I may only decide whether the agreement as written has been breached, not whether
the Agreement as written breaches or violates any law." Rowland Tompkins & Son,
350 Lab. Arb. 154, 156 (1960) (S. Cahn, arbitrator).
14. See generally Cummings, NLRB Jurisdictionand Labor Arbitration: "Uniformity"
vs. "Industrial Peace," 12 LAB. L.J. 425 (1961); Lev & Fishman, supra note 1.
15. Compare, e.g., John W. Bolton & Sons, Inc, 91 N.L.R.B. 989, 26 L.R.R.M. 1598
(1950), 'with Hercules Motor Corp., 136 N..R.B. 1648, 50 L.R.R.M. 1021 (1962).
16. See, e.g., C & S Indus, Inc., 158 N.L.R.B. 454, 62 L.R.R.M. 1043 (1966), where
the Board said:
The Board is not precluded from resolving an unfair labor practice issue
calling for appropriate remedial relief under the Act, simply because as an
incident thereto it may be necessary to construe the scope of a contract
which an arbitrator may also be empowered to construe.
158 N.L.R.B. at 459; 62 L.R.R.M. at 1046.
17. At least insofar as is cornsistent with currently available adequate judicial machinery
for the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate. See notes 82-119 infra and accompanying
.- I I-"
. . te t ,

19721

,NLRB DEFERRAL

Co."" and in Collyer Insulated Wire Corp.,' the Board has proclaimed
that it will defer to arbitration in unfair labor practice controversie's
arising under a collective bargaining agreement where the parties to the
agreement have experienced a long and productive bargaining relationship and there is no charge of employer hostility toward the union. If
the two decisions are relied upon by the Board in the future, the Board
is to be applauded for its long-overdue clarity of purpose.2 ° But in
judging what appears to be a strong developmental step in a trend of
Board and court decisions, clarity should not be of paramount concern.
Where Congress has attempted to strike a delicate balance between
judicial and administrative remedies with a view to implementation of
a social policy, consideration must also be given to the machinery available to effectuate such a redistribution of decisional power. The purpose of this note is to examine some aspects of the development of the
Board's deferral policy and the machinery available to execute the
policy in situations where the arbitration has not been completed prior
to deferral.
HIsToRIcAL INTERPRETATION OF THE ACT

Historic analysis reveals that the Board's disposition of complaints
which embody charges of unfair labor practices as well as contract
breaches has been virtually unpredictable since the enactment of the
Wagner Act.2 In 1. Klotz & Co.,22 one of the Board's earliest cases involving concurrent jurisdiction, the Board refused to defer to an arbitral
award which purportedly resolved charges of employer unfair labor
practices included in a contract breach. The Trial Examiner in Klotz
recommended that the Board dismiss the union complaint, since the
18. 175 N.L.R.B. 141, 70 L.R.R.M. 1472 (1969).
19. 192 N.L.R.B. No. 150, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931 (1971).

20. Among the commonly mentioned reasons advanced in support of a strong Board
deferral policy are: (1) The positive effect upon Labor-management relations presumed
to flow from internal dispute settlement; (2) the reduction in Board caseload expected
to follow from a strong deferral policy; (3) elimination of the disruptive effects upon
the collective bargaining process which result from Board intervention; and (4) the
placement of the expense of settlement upon the parties causing the dispute rather than
on the taxpayer. Anderson, Concurrent Jurisdiction-NLRB and Private Arbitratioh:
A Pragmatic Analysis, 12 B.C. IiND. & Comr. L. REv. 179, 188 (1970). See also Cohen,
NLRB: Poacber on the Arbitral Domain, 55 A.B.A.J. 437 (1969).
21. Compare, e.g., Consolidated Aircraft Corp., 47 N.L.R.B. 694, 12 L.R.R.M. -44

(1943), 'with John W.'Bolton & Sons, Inc., 91 N.L.R.B. 989, 26 L.k.R.M. 159 (1950).
In these tvo"de~isions, similar fact situations prompted the 'Board to defer to arbitrat-on
in Consolidated and to assert its. own jurisiliction in Bolton.
22. 13 N.L.R.B. 746, 4 L.R.R.M. 344 (1939).
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arbitrator's award had satisfied the NLRA's fundamental objectives.2
The Board rejected the recommendation and stated broadly:
[A] settlement of disputes between the parties involved cannot
oust the Board of jurisdiction in regard to those disputes where
they involve unfair labor practices.
The Board in its discretion may proceed to take what action it
deems necessary in connection with such a matter in order to
24
effectuate the purposes and policies of the Act.

In its decision, the Board cited section 10(a) of the NLRA as the
source of its discretionary power.2 5 The significance of Klotz lies in its
lucid expression of the Board's interpretation of the NLRA. Although
section 10(a) seems to state a clear congressional mandate of exclusive
Board jurisdiction, the Klotz decision revealed the Board's early belief
that Congress intended a discretionary grant of authority rather than
a mandatory order of exclusive jurisdiction.26 In countless decisions
23. Id. at 748, 4 L.R.R.M. at 347.
24. Id. at 758-59, 4 L.R.R.M. at 347.
25. Id.
26. A reasonably convincing argument can be made that the legislative history of the
original section 10(a) and its 1948 amendments (see note 4 supra for pertinent text)
supports the Board's interpretation. See Lev & Fishman, supra note 1, at 770-73. This
argument, however, omits mention of several counterveiling factors. First, the supportive argument advances the premise that the word "agreement" in section 10(a)
refers only to agreements executed under the auspices of the National Industrial Recovery
Act. It should be noted that on at least three occasions during the process of passage
of the Wagner Act, comments were directed at the overbreadth of the word "agreements" for accomplishing such an objective. 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS Acr 2024, 2045, 3139 (1949) (Remarks of Harvey T. Kelly) (Remarks
of Clifford Cartwright) (Remarks of Rep. Smith). Second, the supportive argument
ignores the inclusion in the original bill which eventually became the Wagner Act of
a provision specifically allowing the Board to defer exercise of its jurisdiction where
other dispute settlement mechanisms were available. See 1 LEGIsLATIV HISTORY OF T=E
NATIONAL LABOR REATIONS Acr 1301 (1949). Although there appears to be no stated

reason for the deletion of this provision, the retention of the strongly phrased section
10 (a) tends to a conclusion that Congress intended that the Board exercise its jurisdiction in all cases. Third, application of the statutory interpretation doctrine expressia
unius est exclusio alterius to the proviso added to section 10(a) in 1948 would suggest
that had Congress desired that the Board have discretion to defer to other tribunals,
that desire would have found expression in the statute. All of this is not to say that
Congress clearly intended that the Board not have the power to exercise its jurisdiction
in a discretionary manner, but merely to point out that the contrary cannot be argued
without pause.
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since Klotz, the Board has restated this interpretation in a variety of
27
factual contexts.
While retaining great flexibility in the Board, this interpretation of

the NLRA formed an early basis for subsequent jurisdictional problems. In the years immediately following the enactment of the Wagner
Act, the Board generally asserted its own jurisdiction where an over-

lap existed with the arbitral forum. 28 In other instances, however, the
Board chose to defer to arbitration, reasoning that deferral was within
its discretionary power.- Frequently, no factual distinctions could be
drawn between those instances where the Board deferred to arbitration
and those where the Board asserted its own jurisdictional superiority. 0

Indeed, it has been suggested that the Board's caseload at any given time
has been the factor which determined whether the Board would assert

its own jurisdiction or defer.3 '
By 1955, a clear trend had emerged from the growing number of

decisions which resolved jurisdictional overlaps: the Board had become
more willing to surrender its "exclusive" jurisdiction in favor of the

arbitral process. This trend was acknowledged by the Board in Spielberg Manufacturing Co.3 2 In Spielberg, the Board announced that it
would defer to an arbitrator's award where that award resolved a con-

tract controversy which included an unfair labor practice allegation."
In so ruling, the Board qualified its deferral policy by saying that it
would defer only where the collective bargaining agreement bound

both parties to final arbitration, the arbitral proceedings appeared fair
and regular, and the arbitral award was consistent with the purposes
27. See, e.g., NLRB v. Hershey Chocolate Corp., 297 F.2d 286 (1961); NLRB v. Bell
Aircraft Corp., 206 F.2d 235, 32 L.R.R.M. 2550 (2d Cir. 1953); NLRB v. Walt Disney
Prods., 146 F.2d 44, 15 L.R.R.M. 691 (9th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 877 (1945);
NLRB v. Newark Morning Ledger Co, 120 F.2d 262, 7 L.R.R.M. 379 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 314 US. 693 (1941). Although the court questioned the wisdom of the
Board's refusal to accept an arbitral award in Hershey Chocolate, it is interesting
to note that in none of these decisions'was the Board's "discretionary" view of its
jurisdiction questioned.
28. See notes 16 & 27 supra.
29. See, e.g, Hercules Motor Corp., 136 N.R.B. 1648, 50 L.R.R.M. 1021 (1962);
Crown Zellerbach Corp., 95 N.R33. 753, 28 L.R.R.M. 1357 (1951); Consolidated Aircraft Corp., 47 N.L.R.B. 694, 12 L.R.R.M. 44 (1943), modified on other grounds, 141
F.2d 785, 14 L.R.R.M. 553 (9th Cir. 1944).
30. See note 21 supra.
- 31. Samoff, The Case of the Burgeoning Load of the NLRB, 22 LAB. LJ. 611 (1971).
32. 112 N.L.R.B. 1080,36 L.R.R.M 1152 (1955).
33. Id. at 1082; 36 L.R.R.M. at 1153.
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and polices of the Act.34 Essentially, the Board established itself as an
appellate forum in such instances of jurisdictional overlap. 5
In the years following Spielberg, the Supreme Court expressed its
favor for the arbitral process3 6 and held that collective bargaining
agreements to arbitrate are binding and enforceable in the federal
courts. 7 Meanwhile, the Board began shaping its "review" function as
enunciated in Spielberg. Arbitral awards were to be rejected by the
Board only where they appeared to be inconsistent with the policies
of the NLRA, 38 where the arbitrator failed to rule on certain issues,3 9
4 °
or where proceedings did not appear to have been fair and regular.
The Board's policy of arbitral review was perhaps best stated in
Inter-national Harvester Co. 41 There, the Board sustained an arbitral
award and refused to relitigate the dispute, "since it plainly appear[ed]
. . . that the award [was] not palpably wrong." 42 The Board also
shifted its emphasis from section 10 (a) of the NLRA to section 203 (d)
of the NLRA, as evidenced by its conclusion:
34. Id.
35. See notes 125-40 infra and accompanying text.
36. The Arbitration Trilogy: United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,
363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.
574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
37. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). Section 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act permits federal court enforcement of agreements to
arbitrate.
38. International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923, 51 L.R.R.M. 1155 (1962), aff'd sub
nom. Ramsey v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 784, 55 L.R.R.M. 2441 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 377
U.S.1003 (1964).
39. See, e.g., Monsanto Chem. Co., 130 N.L.R.B. 1097, 47 L.R.R.M. 1451 (1961).
Here, the Board refused to honor an arbitration award where the arbitrator had indicated
his avoidance of certain key issues thusly:
I have given a good deal of thought to the dilemma which arises out of the
dual jurisdiction over the essence of the unfair labor practice charges.
Because the NLRB has exclusive jurisdiction in the event of a conflict, and
because I believe the case can be decided on other grounds, I have chosen
to ignore for purposes of decision the allegations herein contained that
[employee's] Union activities played a part in his discharge.
Id. at 1099, 47 L.R.R.M. at 1452. Accord, Ford Motor Co., 131 N.L.R.B. 1462, 48
L.R.R.M. 1280 (1961).
40. See, e.g., Gateway Transp. Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1763, 50 L.R.R.M. 1495 (1962),
where the Board found an arbitrator's refusal to grant a requested continuance to be a
factor in determining whether hearings were "fair and regular" under Spielberg. Accord,
Raytheon Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 883, 52 L.R.R.M. 1129 (1963), rev'd, Raytheon Co. v.
NLRB, 326 F.2d 471 (1st Cir. 1964).
41. 138 N.L.R.B. 923, 51 L.R.R:M. 1155 (1962), aff'd sub nom. Ramsey v. NLRB,
327 F.2d 784, 55 L.R.R.M. 2441 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1003 (1964).
42. 138 N.L.R.B. at 929; 51 L.R.R.M. at 1157-58.
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To require more [than a cursory review by the Board] would
mean substituting the Board's judgment for that of the arbitrator,
thereby defeating the purposes of the Act and the common goal
of national labor policy of encouraging the final adjustment of disputes," as part and parcel of the collective bargaining process."43
It is important to note, however, that the Board in Spielberg did not
address itself to the problem of deferral in instances where arbitration
proceedings had not yet concluded or had not begun. It only recognized
the desirability of arbitration where an arbitral award already had
issued. In those instances where an award had not been rendered, the
status of deferral to arbitration remained unclear. In some cases, the
Board relied on section 203 (d) in exercising discretionary deferral.44
In others, the Board insisted on asserting its own jurisdiction pursuant
to section 10(a) .4 Shortly after Spielberg, the Board demonstrated its
reluctance to extend the arbitral preference to situations where the
parties had not already submitted to arbitration. In Beacon Piece Dyeing
and Finishing Co., Inc., 6 the employer was charged with a section
8(a) (5) violation for refusal to bargain concerning workload and wage
increases. 47 The collective agreement in force at the time of the employer's unilateral action included a broad provision for final binding
arbitration. 8 When the General Counsel issued a complaint based upon
the union charge of unfair labor practices, the Trial Examiner recom43. Id.
44. See, e.g., Montgomery Ward & Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 418, 50 L.R.R.M. 1162 (1962);
Hercules Motor Corp., 136 N.L.R.B. 1648, 50 L.R.R.M. 1021 (1962). But see Anderson,
Concurrent Jurisdiction-NLRB and Private Arbitration: A Pragmatic Analysis, 12
B.C. IN. & Com. L. REv. 179, 187 (1970). The author states that Hercules and other
deferral decisions represented a minority of the total decisions-i.e., the Board asserted
its own jurisdiction in most instances of jurisdictional overlap.
45. See, e.g., Adams Dairy Co., 147 NL.R.B. 1410, 56 L.R.R.M. 1321 (1964); Todd
Shipyards Corp., 98 NLR.B. 814, 29 L.R.R.M. 1422 (1952); Combustion Eng'r. Co,
Inc., 86 N.L.R.B. 1264, 25 L.R.R.M. 1054 (1949).
46. 121 N.L.R.B. 953, 42 L.R.R.M. 1389 (1958).
47. Section 8(a) (5) of the National Labor Relations Act states: "It shall be an
unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees ... 2" 29 U.S.C. 5 158(a) (5) (1970). This provision precludes unilateral employer modifications 6f existing agreements. Any change in substance
of the collective agreement 'musi be discussed with the union.
48. 121 N.L.R.B. at 961. The grievance procedure agreed upon by the parties included compulsory arbitration which covered not only contract matters, but matters
"germane to" the contract as well.
.
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mended that4 9the Board defer to available arbitration, as provided in
the contract.
The Board rejected this recommendation and justified its intervention
by saying:
The Board has consistently held that the collective-bargaining requirement of the Act is not satisfied by a substitution of the
grievance procedure of a contract, unless the grievance provisons
of the contract contain a waiver of the statutory right expressed
in clear and unmistakable terms. And the Board has held further
that there is no such unequivocal waiver where, as here, the grievance provisions make no mention of such a waiver. We therefore find, contrary to the Trial Examiner, that the existence of
the grievance procedure in the contract constitutes no basis for
dismissing the complaint. 50
Thus, despite an apparent jurisdictional overlap, the Board stated
that it would not force arbitration on an unwilling party except where
both parties expressly waive the protection afforded them by section
8 of the Act. The 1958 Beacon Piece Dyeing decision affirmed a longstanding Board distinction between pre-arbitral and post-arbitral deferral
that is difficult to sustain in logic; 5' nevertheless, the distinction survived, largely intact, until Joseph Schlitz52 and Collyer Insulated Wire.5"
If Collyer and Joseph Schlitz can be viewed as clear statements of
the Board's future policy, perhaps the Beacon Piece Dyeing distinction
now has application only in those rare cases involving union animus."
49. Id.
50. Id. See also Hekman Furniture Co., 101 N.L.R.B. 631, 31 L.R.R.M. 1116 (1952);
Leland-Gifford Co., 95 N.L.R.B. 1306, 28 L.R.R.M. 1443 (1951); B.F. Goodrich
Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 1151, 26 L.R.R.M. 1090 (1950).
51. The distinction also arose in Timken Roller Bearing Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 500, 18
L.R.R.M. 1370 (1946). It was criticized in Cox & Dunlap, The Duty to Bargain Collectively During the Term of an Existing Agreement, 63 HARv. L. REv. 1097, 1102
(1950).
52. 175 N.L.R.B. 141, 70 L.R.R.M. 1472 (1969).
53. 192 N.L.R.B. No. 150, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931 (1971).
54. The Collyer decision does not attempt to define the reach of the Board's
new deferral policy nor to set out the administrative procedures for its
implementation; the Board itself recognized its decision as "a developmental
step in the Board's treatment of these problems .

..

."

So, at least in the

short run the administration of this policy can only proceed on the basis of
deductions and inferences drawn from the circumstances upon which the
Board relied in the Collyer case and the incroporated (sic) Schlitz decision.
Memorandum from Peter G. Nash, NLRB General Counsel, to NLRB Regional Direc-
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The two recent cases represented typical factual settings for a jurisdictional overlap. In both cases, employers were charged with "refusal to
bargain" violations when they instituted unilateral changes in working
conditions and wage provisions. 55 The unions filed charges with the
Board before utilizing the grievance procedures provided in the collective bargaining agreements. In both instances, the Board deferred
to arbitration rather than exercise its own jurisdiction.5 6 The Board,
noting that such discretionary deferral has never been questioned by
the courts of appeals or the Supreme Court, attached three conditions
to its favored policy of deferral to available arbitral proceedings: (1)
the parties to the collective agreement must have experienced a long
and productive collective bargaining relationship; (2) there must be
no charge of union anims; and (3) the dispute must center on the
contract and its meaning. 7 This statement of Board preference for
the arbitral forum ostensibly spells the demise of the Beacon Piece
Dyeing distinction between post-arbitral and pre-arbitral deferral in
the usual situation. Additionally, to the extent that they are consistently applied, Collyer Insulated Wire and Joseph Scbitz broaden arbitral jurisdiction. The Board's expanded recognition of the arbitral
forum in Collyer already has evoked the criticism of some union leaders.
One union counselor, particularly inflamed by the Collyer decision,
wrote in a trade journal recently:
[A]llow me to bring to your attention . .. another case which
shows how we [unions] lose in so many different ways. . . . In
a recent NLRB case, a local [union] . . . filed unfair labor practice charges against Collyer Insulated Wire on the ground that
Collyer instituted a wage increase without the consent of the union
which was the exclusive bargaining unit of the employees. This
was a clear and traditional unfair labor practice. But in a three
to two decision, the NLRB held that because the union could
have taken the issue to arbitration under its collective bargaining
tors, Arbitration Deferral Policy under Collyer, Feb. 28, 1972, at 1. Among the substantial questions unanswered by Collyer are (1) the application of deferral to section
8(a) (3) charges; see Id. at 2, see also B-E-C-K-Christenson-Raber-Kief & Associates,
Inc, 195 NL.R.B. No. 95, 2 n.2 (Feb. 25, 1972), and (2) the application of deferral
to grievance procedures not terminating in mandatory final binding arbitration. See
Tulsa-Whisenhunt Funeral Homes, Inc., 195 N.L.R.B. No. 20 (Feb. 1, 1972) (apparently requiring mandatory final binding arbitration).
55. 70 L.R.R.M. at 1473; 77 L.R.R.M. at 1932.
56. 70 L.R.R.M. at 1475; 77 L.R.R.M. at 1940.
57. 77 L.R.R.M. at 1936.
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agreement, the Board would not process the unfair labor practice
complaint. The majority opinion so ruled in the guise of giving
full effect to the parties' own voluntary agreement to submit such
disputes to arbitration. In the process, though, they deprived the
union and the workers of access to statutory remedies which Congress had intended them to have.58 (Emphasis supplied.)
If such dissatisfaction is widespread among unions, the culmination of
the trend toward deferral is likely to encounter strong opposition. If,
indeed, unions view Colleyer Insulated Wire as a denial of a statutory
right to access to the Board, organized labor in some instances might
not acquiesce to what they view as essentially a form of forced arbitration. 9 This opposition may take the form of economic pressure
rather than immediate resort to the arbitral forum as contemplated by
the Board.
MECHANICS

FOR ENFORCEMENT

OF A

CONTRACT TO ARBITRATE

Failing speedy resolution, the underlying issues may fester and
eventually poison the entire bargaining relationship upon which the
contract in question is based. Therefore, in the wake of pre-arbitration
deferral by the Board, if one party remains recalcitrant, the means
available to enforce the contract to arbitrate become important to the
adverse party. There are foureo means by which this result can be
58. Barr, PAINms AND ALLIED TRADES JOURNAL, Oct, 1971, at 9, quoted in letter from
David S. Barr, General Counsel, Int'l Brotherhood of Painters & Allied Trades, to Wm.
& Mary Law Review.
59. 77 L.R.R.M. 1931, 1949 (1971) (Member Jenkins, dissenting).
60. A fifth means might be suggested in the form of a Board order to arbitrate. An
argument for such a procedure might be built around such cases as Port Drum
Co, 170 N.L.R.B. 555, 67 L.R.R.M. 1506 (1968), supplemental order 180 N.L.R.B.
590, 73 L.R.R.M. 1068 (1970), and United Rubber Workers, 150 N.L.R.B. 312 (1964),
enfd, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966). In both cases the Board issued orders to arbitrate.
However, the cases are distinguishable from the deferral situation in Collyer Insulated
T'ire on the grounds that the order in both cases was in the nature of affirmative relief
subsequent to an unfair labor practice finding. Section 10(c) of the NTLRA, 29 U.S.C.
5 160(c) (1970), limits the power of the Board to order a party to take affirmative
action to those situations where such an order is necessary to remedy an unfair labor
practice. In the deferral case, no unfair labor practice is found. Therefore, the Board
seems powerless to order affirmative acts. In any case a union strike subsequent to such
an order would not appear to subject the leaders to contempt punishment if the matters
had been submitted to arbitration. Consequently, the employer would be forced to
court in order to secure complete remedy, rendering a power in the Board to order
arbitration of questionable utility even if present.
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accomplished: (1) section 301 action in federal court; (2) section 301
action in state court; (3) ex 'parte arbitration proceedings; and (4)
Board action either dismissing or issuing a complaint based upon the
charge as appropriate.
Section 301 actions in federal court
Section 301 (a) of the LMRA provides that:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this Act, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States
having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount
in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties0 1
The Supreme Court has made it clear that under this provision the federal district courts may grant specific enforcement of collective bargaining agreements to arbitrate disputes.0
Section 301 actions in state court
It is equally well settled that the pre-emption doctrinese do not
operate to oust state courts of jurisdiction over suits to enforce collective bargaining agreements. In Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney"4
the Court held squarely that state courts had jurisdiction to grant specific enforcement of contracts to arbitrate. The scope of state action
in this area, however, was somewhat limited by the later decision of
61. Labor Management Relations Act § 301(a), 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 5 185 (a)
(1970).
62. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). See also, e.g., Bunn,
Lincoln Mills and Jurisdiction to Enforce Collective Bargaining Agreements, 43 VA. L.
REv. 1247 (1957); Gregory, The Law of the! Collective Agreement, 57 MicH. L. REv.
635 (1959).
63. See generally, Cox, Federalismin the Law of Labor Relations, 67 HARV. L. Rnv.
1297 (1954); DiFede, Problems of Federal-State Jurisdiction in Labor-Management
Disputes, N.Y.U. lIlT CotN. ON LAB. 85 (1958); Gregory, Federal or State Control
of Concerted Union Activities, 46 VA. L. REv. 539 (1960); Hafer, A Pragmatic Article
Concerning Federal Preemption and Labor Law, 1960 Wis. L. REv. 279; Hardy, The
Pre-emption of State Remedies by the National Labor Relations Act, 6 WAK FoMr
INTRA. L. REv. 431 (1970); Hays, State Courts and Federal Preemption, 23 Mo. L. REv.
373 (1958); Isaacson, Federal Pre-emption Under the Taft-Hartley Act, 11 T'I.&
LAB. REL. REv. 391 (1958); Note, Procedural Problems of Policing Preemption, 18
RUTGERS

L. REv. 78.(1963).

64. 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
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Local 714, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co. 5 where the court stated that
"[tlhe dimensions of Section 301 require the conclusion that substantive principles of federal labor law must be paramount in the area
covered by the statute." "
The mandate to apply federal substantive law apparently left the
states free to apply their own procedural law so long as the former
remained paramount. This is merely the converse of the Hanna v.
Plumer6 7 interpretation of the Erie doctrine, under which the federal
courts are required to apply state substantive law.6° An interesting
problem arises where the dispute centers in a state which statutorily
regulates arbitration proceedings." Such statutes normally provide
procedures which must be observed before arbitration may take place.7 °
Enforcement of such statutes would undoubtedly frustrate the congressional policy of accomplishing the administration of collective bargaining agreements under a uniform body of federal law. 7 1 Federal
courts generally do not look to such state arbitration statutes under the
Lincoln Mills doctrine; 72 therefore, in order to further the congressional objective of uniformity, state courts should apply a rule similar
73
to the "outcome determinative test" of Guaranty Trust Co. v. York
in deciding whether to give effect to a local arbitration statute. 74
65. 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
66. ld. at 103.
67. 380 U.S. 460 (1965). The discussion here may be largely academic in industries
affecting commerce since the Supreme Court decision in Avco Corp. v. Machinists, Aero
Lodge 735, 390 U.S. 557 (1968), which held that section 301 suits were removable to federal district courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1970) even though the federal court was
without jurisdiction to grant the relief sought. A fortiori, 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1970) also
allows removal where the relief sought, specific enforcement, is available in federal
courts. However, the procedures for removal, 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (1970), must be
followed.
68. Erie R. R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
69 See, e.g., N.Y. Cn. PRAc. SS 7501-14 (McKinney 1963).
70. See id. 9 7503.
71. Local 714, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
72. For the argument that such state statutes are persuasive as guides in the formulation of federal law, see, Smith & Clark, Reappraisalof the Role of the States in Shaping
Labor Relations Law, 1965 Wis. L. REv. 411, 465. See also Comment, The Applicability
of State Arbitration Statutes to Proceedings Subject to the LMRA Section 301, 27 OHIO
ST. LJ.692 (1966).
73. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
74. But see, e.g., Schoenholtz v. Bentley Lingerie, Inc., 56 L.R.R.M. 2799 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1964).
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Ex Parte Arbitration
In appropriate situations ex parte arbitration offers a swift means of
post-deferral dispute settlement notwithstanding recalcitrance on the
part of one party. However, this procedure is available only where the
pertinent collective bargaining agreement requires only one party to
stipulate the grievance and to select the arbitrator. 75 The non-participating party will be bound by the ex parte determination if an opportunity to be heard was provided, due notice was given, and the proceeding was fair."0
Ex parte arbitration proceedings are, however, subject to dilatory
tactics on the part of the non-participating party which detract somewhat from their effectiveness. These dilatory tactics generally take the
form of a motion to stay arbitration in conjunction with a section 301
suit for a declaratory judgment7 on the issue of arbitrability.78 Appeals have been allowed from an interlocutory orders denying a stay
of arbitration."9 Moreover, it seems unrealistic to expect that the nonparticipating party will comply with the award absent court enforcement.
Board action on deferred charges
Subsequent to a decision to defer to available arbitration, the Board
will investigate the status of the underlying dispute within 90 days."
If this inquiry reveals that one or both of the parties are not making
reasonably prompt efforts to settle the dispute, the concerned regional
director will either (1) issue a complaint based upon the charge or (2)
dismiss the charge."1
This tactic appears to afford the charging party an effective means
of forcing the respondent into the arbitral forum. However, mere dis75. ILGWU v. Senco, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 513 (D. Mass. 1968); Meat Cutters v.
Penobscot Poultry Co., 200 F. Supp. 879 (D. Me. 1961).
76. ILGVWU v. Senco, Inc, 289 F. Supp. 513 (D.Mass. 1968); Local 227, Hod Carriers
v. Sullivan, 221 F. Supp. 696 (ED. I1. 1963); Meat Cutters v. Penobscot Poultry Co.,
200 F. Supp. 879 (D. Me. 1961).
77. 28 U.S.C. S 2201, 2202 (1970).
78. Suits by a party to determine whether his conduct in refusing to arbitrate violates
a collective bargaining agreement would seem to satisfy the "case or controversy" requirement necessary to establish judicial power. See US. CoNsr. art. III, § 1; Radio
Corp. of America v. Engineering Personnel, 291 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1961).
79. Compare Simonds Constr. Co. v. Local 1330, Hod Carriers, 315 F.2d 291 (7th Cir.
1963), witb Chapman v. ILGWU, 401 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1968).
80. Memorandum, supra note 54, at 22.
81. Id.
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missal of the complaint has little coercive effect upon a recalcitrant
charging party. It may often be that the charging party might prefer
Board sanction to economic pressure, but would opt for economic
pressure where the alternative is arbitration.
NEW LIMITATIONS ON THE STRIKE WEAPON

That specific enforcement of collective bargaining agreements to
arbitrate is eventually available by one or another of the mechanisms
discussed in the preceding section cannot be doubted. However, the
dynamics surrounding enforcement of arbitration agreements become
progressively complicated by interjecting a reluctant union equipped
with strike power. Any preference for the arbitral forum is necessarily
qualified if the union is permitted to exert economic pressure subsequent to a Board decision to defer to available arbitration. The detrimental impact of a work stoppage on the overall objective of industrial
peace would reduce Board deferral to a pyrrhic victory for advocates
of the arbitration process.
The proposition is frequently advanced that the quid pro quo for
extraction of an agreement to arbitrate from an employer is the inclusion of a no-strike clause in the contract.8 2 It is readily apparent, however, that arbitration and no-strike clauses are of little significance
unless there is a viable means for their enforcement. Prior to the 1970

decision in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, Local 7703 in which
the Supreme Court provided a limited injunctive remedy against work
stoppages, the employer was relegated to such remedies as damages,
4
self-help, and arbitrator's cease and desist orders.
The compensatory damages remedy 85 has proven to be an ineffec82. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957).
83. 398 U.S. 235 (1970).

84. Prior to Boys Markets the Supreme Court had interpreted the Norris-LaGuardia
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1970), as barring injunctive relief in federal courts. Sinclair
Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962). Thereafter injunctions against strikes in
violation of no-strike provisions were available in some state courts. See, e.g., C. D.
Perry & Sons v. Robilotto, 23 App. Div. 2d 949, 260 N.Y.S.2d 158 (1965); McCarroll v.
Los Angeles County District of Carpenters, 49 Cal. 2d 45, 315 P.2d 322 (1957), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958). Even this method of obtaining injunctive relief was
denied to employers when in 1968 the Supreme Court held that section 301 suits were
removable to federal district courts by unions as of right. Avco Corp. v. Machinists,
Aero Lodge 735, 390 U.S. 557 (1968). This development was viewed by the lower
federal courts as requiring dissolution of an injunction issued by a state court prior to
removal. See General Elec. Co. v. Local 191, IUE, 413 F.2d 964, (5th Cir. 1969).
85. "An action for damages prosecuted during or after a labor dispute would only
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tive approach due to the difficulty of ascertaining damages 6 caused by
the strike. Additionally, where there is a broad arbitration clause the
employer will be forced to arbitrate 7 the damages question before
proceeding to court action.88

The self-help remedy

9

whereby the employer discharges employees

for a breach of a no-strike caluse also has serious drawbacks.90 Even if
the employer is successful in breaking the strike by means of the discharge, such action probably will adversely affect the operation of his
business. In addition, the reasonableness of the employer's action is

subject to review by the arbitrator.91

The arbitrator's cease and desist order has been suggested as a viable
alternative to the injunction. 92 This also is a restricted remedy since

the power to issue such an order must be found in the terms of the
collective bargaining agreement. Where such relief is permitted, it has

*been held that judicial enforcement of the award is not foreclosed by
the statutory ban against labor injunctions.98
If itis accepted that these alternative remedies are relatively ineffec-

tual, the employer must depend on injunctive relief as the only viable

94
means for enforcing arbitration where a work stoppage is in progress.

tend to aggravate industrial strife and delay an early resolution of the difficulties between employer and union." 398 U.S. at 248. Accord, Fulda, The No-Strike Clause,
21 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 127, 144 (1952). (Report of the Committee on Improvement
of Administration of Union-Employer Contracts, ABA Section of Labor Relations
Law.)
86. It is particularly difficult to attach a dollar value to such items as good will,
future profits, and lost customers. 37 BnooxrL, L. REv. 214, 219 (1970).
87. Id. It has been held that an employer's claim for damages for breach of a nostrike clause is subject to arbitration. This requirement forces the employer to
exhaust the grievance procedure as well as contend with the backlog in the courts
before he can obtain relief. Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 50, Am. Bakery and Confectionery Workers, 370 U.S. 254 (1962).
88. Some cases, however, have permitted an award of exemplary damages. See S.
Wanzer and Son, Inc. v. Milk Driver's Local 753, 249 F. Supp. 664 (N.D. IMI.1966);
United Shoe Workers, Local 127 v. Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co, 187 F. Supp. 509 (E.D. Pa.
1960), rev'd, 298 F.2d 277 (3d Cir. 1962).
89. Southwest Banana Distrib, Inc., 145 N.L.R.B. 815, 55 L.R.R.M. 1056 (1964).
90. See 16 Vr. L.R av. 176, 185 (1970).
91. Id. If there is no other motive the discharge would not be considered an unfair
labor practice. It would appear, however, to be possible to avoid the need for an
arbitrator's review of the reasonableness of the action by drafting a no-strike clause
specifically giving the employer power to discharge for breach of a no-strike provision.
92. Id. at 183.
93. New Orleans Steamship Ass'n v. General Long Shore Workers, 389 F.2d 369
(5th Cir. 1968).
94. "Any incentive for employers to enter such an arrangement is necessaiily dis-
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The majority in Collyer recognizes this need for effective methods
of enforcing the no-strike clause and appears to assume that they exist,
stating:
After Boys Markets it may truly be said that where a contract
provides for arbitration, either party has at hand legal and effective means to ensure that the arbitration will occur.95 (Emphasis supplied.)
The position of the Board majority appears to be that the employer's
dilemma was resolved and that he was provided with an effective and
comprehensive means of enforcement of contractual no-strike provisions by the decision of the Supreme Court in Boys Markets. 6 While
management unquestionably retrieved a significant portion of its injunctive remedy as a result of that decision, a close analysis of Boys
Markets, considered in relation to prior and subsequent decisions, does
not necessarily support the broad interpretation which might be suggested by the Board in Collyer.
In specifically overturning its decision in Sinclair Refining Co. v.
Atkinson,97 the Court placed emphasis on recent congressional enactments and court decisions favoring peaceful settlement of labor disputes through arbitration. 8
sipated if the principal and most expeditious method by which the no-strike obligation
can be enforced is eliminated." Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, Local 770, 398
U.S. 235, 248 (1970).
95. Collyer Insulated Wire Corp., 192 N.L.R.B. No. 150, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931, 1937
(1971).
96. 398 U.S. 235, 239. The labor dispute in Boys Markets arose when a supervisor
in the employer's supermarket used non-bargaining unit personnel to rearrange frozen
food cases. The employer refused to agree to the demands of the union representative
to strip the cases and have them restocked by union personnel. A strike was called,
the employer obtained a temporary restraining order in the state court, and the union
removed to the federal district court. The district court left the restraining order in
effect and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed.
97. 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
98. "We conclude, therefore, that the unavailability of equitable relief in the arbitration context presents a serious impediment to the congressional policy favoring the
voluntary establishment of a mechanism for peaceful resolution of labor disputes ...
398 U.S. at 253.
It has been suggested, however, that the premise that an injunctive remedy is required
to encourage arbitration is fallacious since unions may not agree to binding arbitration
provisions when forced to choose between the right to strike and the right to arbitrate.
See 46 WAsH. L. REv. 805, 817 (1971). It appears that neither the Court's suggestion
that equitable relief will foster arbitration nor the commentator's assertion that such
relief may stultify the process can be supported on the basis of empirical data. On the
whole injunctive relief seems to find more solid support in logic.
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In treating what had previously been viewed in Sinclair as a conflict between the prohibitions of the Norris-LaGuardia Ac&9 and the
use of injunctive relief under section 301 of the LMRA, the Court
stressed the need for accommodation 0 0 of the provisions of the two

acts and stated:
Statutory interpretation requires more than concentration upon
isolated words; rather, consideration must be given to the total
corpus of pertinent law and the policies which inspired ostensibly
inconsistent provisions.","

The collective bargaining agreement under which the dispute arose
in Boys Markets contained a broad arbitration clause providing that "all
controversies concerning its interpretation or application should be
resolved by adjustment and arbitration procedures set forth therein.
. . .102

The arbitration clause was complemented by a coextensive

no-strike clause.'03 The Court took notice of these provisions while
enunciating stringent guidelines to be followed by the federal district
courts in section 301 suits involving requests for injunctive relief against
union strike activity. These requirements 4 included determinations
by the district court that: (1) the collective bargaining agreement contain a mandatory adjustment or arbitration procedure, (2) the strike is
,over an issue which both parties are bound under the contract to arbi99. 29 U.S.C. S 104 (1970).
100. Several ways have been suggested to avoid the need for accommodating the
two acts. One commentator suggests this could be achieved by employing judicial, enforcement of cease and desist orders issued by an arbitrator under authority of the contract. This argument contends that such a procedure can be distinguished from an injunction on the basis that it is derived from a voluntary agreement to arbitrate.' It Is
further argued that Norris-LaGuardia would not be an obstacle since it prohibits injunctions in "labor disputes" as opposed to judicial enforcement of arbitration awards.
See 16 VILL. L. Rav. 176, 183 (1970). For judicial support of this approach see, New
Orleans Steamship Ass'n v. General Long Shore Workers, 389 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1968).
A second method would be to consider violations of a no-strike clause as prima facie
violations of the NLRA rather than mere evidence of bad faith bargaining as is the
present policy. Under this procedure the federal courts would obtain jurisdiction in
injunction cases only at the request of the NLRB. Vladeck, Boys Market and the
National Labor Policy, 24 VAND. L. REv. 93, 100 (1970).
101. 398 U.S. at 250.
102. Id. at 238.
103. The no-strike clause stated that for the duration of the contract there should
be "no cessation or stoppage of work, lock-out, picketing or boycotts ... ." Id. at 239.
104. Id. at 254.
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trate, 1 5 (3) the employer agrees to arbitrate as a condition of obtaining an injunction against the strike, and (4) the injunction would be
warranted under ordinary principles of equity. Under the fourth
requirement the Court isolated such considerations as "whether breaches
are occurring and will continue, or have been threatened and will be
committed; whether they have caused or will cause irreparable injury
to the employer; and whether the employer will suffer more from the
denial of an injunction than will the union from its issuance." 106
In enumerating these specific standards the Court emphasized the
restrictive limits of its decision, declaring:
Our decision in the present case is a narrow one. We do not undermine the vitality of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. . . . Nor does
it follow from what we have said that injunctive relief is appropriate as a matter 7of course in every case of a strike over an arbi10
trable grievance.
In light of these restrictive statements, one consideration which might
substantially limit the availability of injunctive relief under Boys
Markets lies in the distinction between economic strikes and unfair
labor practice strikes. In criticizing the majority's reliance on Boys
Markets as support for their decision to defer to arbitration, one of the
dissenters in Collyer emphasized that the Collyer dispute involved an
unfair labor practice,' 08 whereas, Boys Markets did not.10 9 This distinction could have a substantial effect on the Board deferral policy.
If Boys Markets does not provide authority for enjoining unfair labor
practice strikes, unions might simply assert the existence of the conduct
upon which the Board has declined to rule as protecting a post-deferral
strike against injunction. Such a course would either force the Board
to hear and decide the issues, or require the district court, as part of
the injunction proceeding, to hear evidence sufficient to find that no
unfair labor practice exists.
When Boys Markets is considered in conjunction with prior deci105. It has been contended that this would put the employer in the position that in
order to stop a strike he must agree to arbitrate even those grievances which he in
good faith believes are not arbitrable. Vladeck, supra note 98, at 101.
106. 398 U.S. at 254.
107. Id. at 253-54.
108. 192 N.L.R.B. No. 150, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931, 1947 (1971) (Member Jenkins, dissenting).
109. See note 96 supra.
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sions, there appears to exist a strong argument in support of this proposition.

In the 1956 decision of Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 110 the Supreme Court recognized the right of employees to strike in an unfair
labor practice dispute although such right would not have existed had
the dispute involved an economic matter."' in reaching this result, the
Court dismissed the contention that the broad no-strike clause referring
to "any strike" should be interpreted to waive the employee's right to
strike against an employer's unfair labor practice. 2 The Court assumed that the employees could have waived the right to strike against
unfair labor practices, but appeared to say that such a waiver must be
m haec verba to be effective." 3 When considered alongside Mastro
Plastics, it seems doubtful that Boys Markets provides authority for
enjoining strikes against employer conduct which might fairly be characterized as an unfair labor practice, regardless of the arbitrability of
such matters under the collective bargaining agreement. 114
Although not specifically adopting the argument for restricting Boys
Markets in the manner suggested above, the cases subsequent to that
decision have generally required a narrow application of that holding.
In those cases where an injunction has been permitted, the courts have
stringently adhered to the Boys Markets guidelines."15 It is also significant that in none of these decisions was there a dispute over conduct
which would be classified as an unfair labor practice.
110. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956).
'111. Id. The employer had refused to reinstate union members who went on strike
during the 60 day waiting period provided for in section 8(d) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C.
F 158(d) (1970), and in violation of a no-strike clause. Although by striking under
these conditions the workers would have lost their employee status if this had been an
economic dispute, the Court held this would not be the result where an unfair labor
practice was involved.
112. Id. at 281.

113. Id. at 279. The phrase "explicit contractual provision" used in reference to
waiver of unfair labor practice strikes has been interpreted to mean an in haec verba
waiver. Mid-West Metallic Prod., Inc., 121 N.L.R.B. 1317, 42 L.R.R.M. 1552 (1958)
114. In one case the union cited Mastro Plastics in arguing that the "modification
of the collective bargaining contract was a breach of the contract and an unfair labor
practice excusing any violation of the no-strike clause." The court, however, made no
reference to this argument in their holding. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Communication
Workers, Local 6222, 324 F Supp. 830, 831 (S.D. Tex. 1971).

115. See, e.g., Stein Printing Co. v. Atlanta Typographical Union No. 48, 329 F.
Supp. 754 (ND. Ga. 1971); Hilton Int'l Co. v. Asociacion De Empleados De Casino
De Puerto Rico, 324 F Supp. 492 (D.P.R. 1971); Holland Constr. Co. v. International
Union of Operating Eng'r, Local 101, 315 F Supp. 7.91 (D. Kan. 1970).

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13:824

A more convincing argument may be advanced, however, to the

effect that this suggested limitation on Boys Markets applies only to
a particular class of unfair labor practice disputes. This argument reads
Mastro Plastics narrowly, limiting its application to those unfair labor
practice disputes which clearly involve union animus"6 and which
jeopardize the very existence of the union. The facts in Mastro Plasticsa" 7 seem to support this position since the unfair labor practice there
concerned the employer's solicitation of an insurgent union."'

The Board announced in Collyer that it would defer to arbitration
only in situations where the questioned conduct was not motivated by
116. One district court distinguished Mastro on the basis of animus stating:
We do not consider Mastro relevant here anyway because there was no
showing that Roadway was attempting to destroy the union or the collective
bargaining rights of its employees protected by Sections 7 and 8(a), and
because in any case it could not be said that the strike was directed solely
against any alleged unfair labor practice of the employer. [Emphasis supplied].
Roadway Express, Inc. v. Highway Truck Drivers, Local 107, 299 F. Supp. 1058, 1062
(E.D. Pa. 1969). See also, Mid-West Metallic Prod., Inc., 121 N.L.R.B. 1317, 42
L.R.R.M. 1552 (1958).
117. 350 U.S. 270 (1956).
118. Although there may be few situations where the employer cannot obtain an
injunction, the pre-arbitral strike could still prove of value to the union in situations
involving unilateral changes in working conditions. The basis for this contention is
found in the procedure used to handle analogous situations under the Railroad Labor
Act (RLA). Existing authority permits the use of injunctive relief to halt strike
activity in situations which the RLA classes as "minor disputes." Brotherhood of R.R.
Trainmen v. Chicago River & Ind. R.R. Co., 353 U.S. 30 (1957). As a corollary to this
decision, the Court has subsequently applied equitable principles in formulating its
decree to require the employer who seeks relief against a strike to return to the status
quo, existing at the time the dispute arose. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'r. v.
Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. Co., 363 U.S. 528 (1960). By analogy, it would appear
that in disputes arising outside the RLA in which the employer has made unilateral
changes, the union might strike, and when the employer seeks injunctive relief, request
counter-relief requiring the employer to return to the status quo. This argument has
been employed with success on at least one occasion. American Can Co. v. Pulp
Workers, No. 71-370, 77 L.R.R.M. 2633 (1971). It may not even be necessary,
however, for the union to go on strike in order to force the employer to return
to the status quo. While the Court in the Missouri-Kansas case specifically left
open the question of whether the union could obtain such relief independent of an
employer's action to enjoin a strike, several lower federal courts have answered the
question in the affirmative and provided declaratory relief in RLA cases. Westchester
Lodge 2186, Bhd. of R.R. & Steamship Clerks v. Railway Express Agency, 329 F.2d
748 (1964); Airlines Stewards & Stewardesses Ass'n, Local 550 v. Caribbean Ad. Airlines,
Inc, 289 F. Supp. 841 (1968). There would appear to be an equally strong basis for
contending that such relief should also be available in non-RLA disputes.
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union anivms n9 By circumscribing its pre-arbitral deferral policy in
this manner, the Board appears to have attempted to accomplish a laudable dual objective: (1) to confine deferral to those situations where
both parties possess the full panoply of remedies necessary to force
arbitration; and (2) to ensure that both parties are aware that the Board
stands ready to exercise its statutory powers to remedy conduct which
is aimed at the veryr heart of the bargaining process.
REVIEW AND ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITAiL AwARDs

Although the record of voluntary compliance with arbitration awards
has been surprisingly good, there has been speculation that the reaction
may be somewhat different where the parties are remitted to the arbitral forum as a result of Board deferral."" Assuming that there is truth
in this assertion, two reactions may be expected: (1) a decline in the
use of arbitration as a means of contractual dispute settlement; 12' and
(2) an increase in post-award litigation, both in the courts and before
the Board. The latter reaction, under current precedent, may present
a puzzling question concerning the proper authority to render a final
decision on enforceability of a particular award.
There is little doubt that arbitrators may hear and adjudicate issues
where the underlying conduct may be characterized as either a contract
breach or an unfair labor practice or both. 122 There remains, however,
119. The General Counsel regards union animus as capable of display through either
(1) particular conduct not motivated by legitimate business or economic considerations
but by an effort to undermine the union or (2) "a history of employer violations of the
Act of a kind which demonstrates deliberate interference with the right of employees
to engage in protected concerted activity or which demonstrates deliberate rejection
of the principles and practices of collective bargaining . . ." Memorandum, supra
note 54, at 5, 15.
120. Collyer Insulated Wire, 77 LR.R.M. 1931, 1949 (Member Jenkins, dissenting).
121. Member Jenkins asserts that there may already be a significant trend in this
direction.Id. Should this be the result of a strong NLRB deferral policy, the Board
will find itself in the position of defeating the policy which deferral is designed to.advance. Collyer Insulated Wire, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1936. The question thus raised cannot
be answered by philosophic speculation about probable effects, but until empirical data
becomes available must be left to the judgment of the majority of the Board in its role
as the body possessing expertise in the field of labor management relations.
122. Where the conduct to be adjudicated by arbitration constitutes both an alleged
unfair labor practice and an alleged breach of contract, the argument has beeni, advanced that the arbitrator has no authority to act. This argument was based upon the
preemption doctrines established by the Supreme Court decisions in Garner v. Teamsters, 346 U.S. 485 (1953) and San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S.
236 (1959). Those opposing the use of the arbitral forum as a means of disposing of
controversies arising out of conduct arguably protected by section 7 or prohibited by
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considerable controversy' over the extent to which the substantive law
of unfair labor practices should influence the arbitral award.1 ta Theresection 8 of the NLRA argued that the reasoning of the preemption doctrine was quite
as applicable to the arbitral forum as to the state courts. See, e.g., Conover-Cable
Piano Co, 31 Lab. Arb. 589, 591 (1958) (T. Sambower, arbitrator). This argument appears to have been authoritatively quashed by the fifth circuit decision in Lodge No. 12,
District No. 37, IAM v. Cameron Iron Works, Inc., 257 F.2d 467 (1958). In enforcing a
contract to submit the grievances to arbitration over the employer's argument that the
particular conduct was not arbitrable because it was within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Board, the court said:
[In this case . .. substantially the same conduct here involved would constitute a violation of the contract and an unfair labor practice. The distinguishing point is that, while an act may be both an arbitrable contract
violation and an unfair labor practice, a "breach of contract is not an
unfair labor practice"; the former is enforced by the courts, the latter by
the Board; the former gives to private parties a remedy, the latter uses a
private right to effectuate the declared policies of the Act; the former
gives a certainty of decision, the latter leaves decision discretionary. Section
10(a) of the Act states that the power of the Board over unfair labor practices "shall not be effected by any other means of adjustment or prevention
that has been or may be established by agreement, law or otherwise." Will
the submission of a contract violation, which is also an unfair labor practice,
to arbitration "affect" this power of the Board? Certainly not. Since the
Board's power is plenary in all respects, "neither the existence of an agreement to arbitrate nor a rendered award can preclude the Board from exercising its statutory jurisdiction." But certainly an agreement to arbitrate
may serve to temporarily assuage the aggrieved party and afford validity
to contract terms (even including unfair labor practices) until a final disposition of the matter of unfair labor practice be made by the Board. Even
though the Board is not bound by an arbitration award, it may find that
compliance with the award is not violative of the Act, or it may even, in
the exercise of its discretionary power, decline action because an award
has been made or arbitration is possible.
See also Carey v. Westinghouse, 375 U.S. 261 (1964); Local 714, Teamsters v. Lucas
Flour Co, 369 U.S. 95, 101 n.9 (1961).
123. See, e.g., Mittenthal, The Role of the Law in Arbitration in DEVELOPMENTS
IN

AmERIcAN

MEETING

AND

NATIONAL

FOREIGN

ARBITRATION,

ACADEMY OF

PROCEEDINGS

ARBITRATORS

OF THE TWENTY-FIRsT

42 (Rehmus ed. 1968)

ANNUAL

(published with

rejoinder by Bernard Meltzer, a reprise by Robert Howlett, and a discussion by Theodore St. Antoine). These articles raise the difficulty of ascertaining the "law" with
certainty as a primary obstacle to use of unfair labor practice law in the arbitral
forum. Over the years since the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 237 (1946),
many voices have been raised in a call for promulgation of interpretive and legislative
rules by the Board. See generally Bernstein, The NLRBs Adjudication-Rule Making
Dilermna Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 79 YALE L.J. 571 (1970). Perhaps
in the deferral context such rules might be a means whereby the Board could more
easily ensure that the policies of the NLRA are carried forward. It appears that such
rules would be more readily applied by arbitrators than are the current hotch-pot of
decisional law. See generally F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBIRATiON WoRKs
218-41 (2d ed. 1960).
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fore, in considering a broad Board deferral policy it is necessary to
examine the procedures for enforcement and review of awards-parrefuses to consider the substantive
ticularly those where the arbitrator
24
law of unfair labor practices.1

The NLRB
There is little doubt that the Board has jurisdiction to condemn conduct as an unfair labor practice notwithstanding that the conduct is
arguably permitted by a collective bargaining agreement. 1 25 It appears
that as a concomitant of a strong deferral policy the NLRB will employ this jurisdiction as a means of retaining the right to review the
resulting arbitral awards.12 6
Presumably review of arbitral proceedings resulting from a preaward deferral policy will be based upon the same criteria as have been
previously utilized in connection with existing awards. These standards
of review were set out in the oft-cited Spielberg Mfg. Co.' 27 and were
later explicated in International Harvester Co 128 In these cases the
Board indicated that it would accept an arbitrator's determination when
(1) all parties bad agreed to be bound by the arbitrator's decision,
(2) the proceedings appear to have been fair and regular, and (3) the
arbitrator's decision 29is not clearly repugnant to the purposes and poli1
cies of the NLRA.
124. See, e.g., Art Steel Co., 56 Lab. Arb. 481 (1971) (B. Turkus, arbitrator).
125. NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432 (1967); NLRB v. C & C Plywood
Corp, 385 U.S. 421 (1967).
126. We find no basis for the assertion of our dissenting colleagues that our
decision modifies the standards established in Spielberg for judging the acceptability of an arbitrator's award.
It is true, manifestly, that we cannot judge the regularity or statutory acceptability of the result in an arbitration proceeding which has not occurred. However, we are unwilling to adopt the presumption that such a
proceeding will be invalid under Spielberg and to exercise our decisional
authority at this juncture on the basis of a mere possibility that such a
proceeding might be -unacceptable under Spiejberg standards. That rsk is
far better accommodated, we believe, by the result reached here of retaining
jurisdiction

"CollyerInsulated Wire, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1937.
127. 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 36 L.R.R.M. 1152 (1955).
128. 138 N.L.R.B. 923, 51 L.R.R.M. 1155 (1962).
129. 112 N.L.R.B. at 1082, 36 L.R.R.M. at 1153. In InternationalHarvester Co. the
Board felt confident in accepting the arbitral award "since it plainly appears to us that
the award was not palpably wrong."
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The criteria established by the Board seem to limit post-award review
to surface inquiries concerning the contractual commitment to arbitrate, the compliance with an elementary standard of procedural due
process, and at least colorable consistency with the congressional policies found in the NLRA. An examination of the cases under these
standards, however, reveals that the Board has often been much more
willing to examine the merits of the dispute underlying the award than
the Spielberg criteria might suggest. Evidence of the extent to which
the Board examines the merits as part and parcel of its decisions to
defer to the arbitrator's decision in the post-award situation can be
gleaned from decisions involving discriminatory discharges.'30
In Illinois Ruan Transport Corp.13x an employee was discharged
ostensibly for misuse of company vehicles and for lying to his supervisor. The discharge was submitted to a joint committee for final
resolution. 132 After the discharge was sustained by the committee, a
complaint based upon alleged violation of section 8 (a) (1) and section
8(a) (3) was filed with the Board. After a determination had been
made by the Trial Examiner that the question of discrimination for
participation in protected activities had not been raised before the
committee, 3 3 the Board felt free to disregard the committee award
and to proceed to consider the merits of the unfair labor practice charge.
The Board decision in Waggoner Transport Co. 134 demonstrates that
under the Spielberg criteria the Board will, at times, allow a trial de
novo of the facts upon which an arbitral decision must have been based.
In this case the arbitral award stated no reasons for sustaining the discharge involved; but, because of a contract provision allowing a 24-hour
grace period for wildcat strikes, the arbitral decision must have been
based upon a conclusion that the work stoppage in question had been
in excess of 24 hours. 1 35 The NLRB received evidence on the duration
of the unauthorized work stoppage and, upon concluding that the
maximum duration was seven hours, ordered the employee reinstated.'36
130. Such discharges violate 29 U.S.C.

§

158(a) (3) (1970). Note that the General

Counsel has directed Regional Directors not to apply Collyer to the administrative
handling of section 8(a) (3) charges. Memorandum, supra note 54, at 2.
131. 165 NL.R.B. 227, 65 L.R.R.M. 1296 (1967).
132. Such committees have the same status as arbitrators for purposes of application
of the Spielberg doctrine. Terminal Transp. Co., 185 NL.R.B. No. 96, 75 L.R.R.M. 1130,
1131 n.5 (1970).
133. 165 N.L.R.B. at 231.
134. 177 N.L.R.B. 452 (1969).
135. Id. at460.
136. Id. at 467.
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On the other hand, the Board has at times refused to upset arbitral
awards on the basis of different conclusions drawn from the evidence
presented before both forums. In Terminal Transport Co. 37 the Trial
Examiner recommended disregard for an arbitral award sustaining a
discharge, subject to a job qualification test. The employee had refused
the test and introduced evidence in the unfair labor practice proceeding
sufficient to persuade the Trial Examiner that his discharge had been
discriminatory. Notwithstanding the Trial Examiner's conclusion that
the award could not be construed as having taken the issue of discriminationinto account, the Board held that the award was merely ambiguous, therefore meriting conclusive effect. 13
Although it has been suggested that the Board's application of the
Spielberg criteria has assumed chameleon-like aspects, 13 9 the foregoing
afford some interesting comparisons with the review standards applied
by the courts in determining the enforceability of arbitral awards, 40 at
least in discharge disputes.
The Courts
After an arbitral award has been rendered, judicial machinery is
available to enforce the award in any situation where one party appears
unwilling to abide by the abritrator's decision. Section 301 of the
LMRA, authorizing federal courts to entertain suits involving violations
of union contracts, also is construed to confer jurisdiction on the courts
to enforce or vacate arbitral awards.' 4 ' The Supreme Court has said
that state courts share concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts
for purposes of award enforcement under section 301.142 State courts
also must apply the federal labor law which has evolved since Lincoln
Mills.143 Both state and federal courts are restricted in their review of
137. 185 NL.R.3. No. 96, 75 L.R.R.M. 1130 (1970).
138. 75 L.R.R.M. at 1132.
139. Atleson, Disciplinary Discbarges, Arbitration and NLRB Deference, 20 BUFF.
L. REv. 355 (1971).

140. It might also be suggested that if the deferral policy is designed to lighten the
Board caseload, note 20 supra, the extensive fact finding processes utilized under the
Spielberg criteria seem to offer little relief. The conclusion that Collyer Insulated
Wire will do little to lessen the Board caseload is buttressed by the requirement for
a precedent finding of no union anirnus. See notes 82-119 supra and accompanying text.
141. See the Arbitration Trilogy, supra note 36; Milk & Ice Cream Drivers & Dairy
Employees v. Gillespie Milk Prods. Corp., 203 F.2d 650 (6th Cir. 1953); Glass Bottle
Blowers Ass'n v. Arkansas Glass Container Corp., 183 F. Supp. 829 (D. Ark. 1960).
142. Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
143. Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
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such awards, however, since the collective agreements normally provide
that the decision of the arbitrator is final and binding. M4 Thus, when
a court is asked to enforce an arbitral award, it generally is not free
to substitute its own interpretation for that of the arbitrator.' 4 In the
Steelworkers Trilogy, the Supreme Court declared its reluctance to
disturb the final effect of arbitration:
The refusal of courts to review the merits of an arbitration award
is the proper approach to arbitration under collective bargaining
agreements. The federal policy of settling labor disputes by arbitration would be undermined if courts had the final say on the
merits of the awards. .... 146
At the same time, the Court recognized that in certain narrowlydefined instances arbitral awards should not be accorded finality:
[A] n arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of the
collective bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense his
own brand of industrial justice. He may of course look for guidance from many sources, yet his award is legitimate only so long
as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement.
When the arbitrator'swords manifest an infidelity to this obligation, courts have no choice but to refuse enforcement of the
award.147 (Emphasis supplied.)
In their execution of the Trilogy's mandate, courts have fashioned a
review policy vis-a-vis arbitral awards that appears to be similar to but
narrower than the Board's policy as established in Spielberg.
In the United States Arbitration Act,'48 Congress established four
grounds for vacating awards: (a) where the award was procured by
corruption, fraud, or undue means;' 49 (b) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them;"" (c) where
the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the
hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence
144.
145.
Conn.
(1962).
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

See note 9 supra.
See, e.g., Local 1078, UAW v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 256 F. Supp. 686 (D.
1966); Dehnart v. Waukesha Brewing Co., 17 Wis. 2d 44, 115 N.W.2d 490
United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960).
Id. at 597.
9 U.S.C. §5 1-208 (1970).
9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (1970).
9 U.S.C. § 10(b) (1970).
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pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior
by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced;151 or (d) where
the arbitrators exceeded their powers or so imperfectly executed them
definfite award upon the subject matter subthat a mutual, final, and
152
mitted was not made.

Although the Arbitration Act specifically excludes contracts for employment from its scope,'53 some courts entertaining section 301 suits
have consulted the Act as a standard for judicial review of arbitration."
Courts that have not consulted the Arbitration Act nevertheless have
applied similar
tests in determining the conclusiveness of arbitral
55
awards.1

The mandate against judicial plenary review restricts state courts 56
and federal courts 157 alike. When a party petitions a court to vacate
an award because of alleged error on the merits of the dispute, summary
judgment will issue.' 58 Although a court may remand an ambiguous

award for clarification,

59 it

is generally true that arbitrators have no

151. 9 U.S.C. § 10(c) (1970).
152. 9 U.S.C. § 10(d) (1970).
153. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1970) states:

... but nothing herein shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen,
railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or
interstate commerce.
154. See, e.g., Hoover Motor Express Co. v. Local 327, Teamsters, 217 F.2d 49 (6th
Cir. 1954). There, the court interpreted section 1 of the Arbitration Act in a manner
that did not exclude labor agreements:
A collective bargaining agreement is not a contract of employment [within
the meaning of the Arbitration Act] . . . . The exception in Section 1
of the Arbitration Act we think was intended to avoid the specific performance of contracts for personal srevices and not to apply to collective
labor agreements.
217 F.2d at 53. See also Minkoff v. Scranton Frocks, Inc., 181 F. Supp. 542 (S.D.N.Y.),
aff'd, 279 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1960); United Elec. Workers v. Star Expansion Indus., Inc.,
246 F. Supp. 400 (Si.N.Y. 1964).
155. See, e.g., Local 107, Highway Truck Drivers & Helpers v. Motor Transp. Labor
Relations, Inc., 232 F. Supp. 782 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
156. Dehnart v. Waukesha Brewing Co., 17 Wis. 2d 44, 115 N.W.2d 490 (1962).
157. E.g., Local 1078, UAW v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 256 F. Supp. 686 (D. Conn.

1966).
158. Local 1241, IBEW v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 207 F. Supp. 423 (ED.
Pa. 1962). But see Torrington Co. v. Local 1645, Metal Prods. Workers, 362 F.2d 677
(2d Cir. 1966). The Torrington decision has been criticized by a leading commentator
as an "indefensible inroad into contractual finality." Dunau, Three Problems in Labor
Arbitration, 55 VA. L. REv. 427, 554 (1969).
159. United Steelworkers v. Timkin Roller Bearing Co., 324 F.2d 738 (6th Cir. 1963).
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obligation to the courts to offer reasons for their awards.' ° Even if
new evidence is brought to the court which impugns an arbitrator's
decision, the arbitral award should not be vacated.''
This is not to say, however, that all arbitral awards are automatically
upheld by state and federal courts in section 301 suits. If a court finds
evidence of procedural unfairness in the arbitral proceedings, or if it
finds that the arbitrator lacked authority to have heard the dispute in
the first instance, the award almost surely will be vacated.
Judicial vacation on grounds of procedural unfairness is rare in labor
disputes. Several factors may account for this. One plausible explanation is that dissatisfied parties after arbitration may have preferred
Board appeal to judicial review; consequently, the judiciary would have
less opportunity to review arbitral procedure. The preference for administrative appeal might be explained by a general awareness that the
Board's review is not as narrow as judicial review, especially where
unfair labor practice conduct arguably is an issue. Courts consistently
have adopted a standard similar to that enunciated in Bieski v. Eastern
Automobile Forwarding Co., 62 where it was said that:
[T]he question of judicial review of a "final" private decision
should turn on the adequacy of the private decision under the
contract in terms of the controversy presented. If the court is convinced . ..that the intended procedure was adequate to provide
a fair and informed decision, then review of the merits of any decision should be limited to cases of fraud, deceit, or instances of
unions in breach of their duty of fair representation.'63
In determining whether arbitration procedures were "adequate to
provide a fair and informed decision," courts generally examine such
factors as postponements, notice to parties, evidentiary rulings, and
scheduling of hearings. Judicial cognizance of arbitral flexibility probably has had the effect of limiting review to those instances where procedural error is blatant and prejudicial.
An example of procedural error appears in Harvey Aluminum, Inc.
v. United Steelworkers of America,'" where an award was vacated
160. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1959).
161. Bridgeport Rolling Mills Co. v. Brown, 314 F.2d 885 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 821 (1963).
162. 396 F.2d 32 (3d Cir. 1968), voted in 55 VA. L. REv. 361 (1969).
163. 396 F.2d at 37-38.
164. 263 F. Supp. 488 (C.D. Cal. 1967).
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-because of the arbitrator's refusal to allow an eyewitness to complete
his testimony. In Harvey, the employer discharged an employee for
alleged misconduct during a strike. At arbitration, the employee was
reinstated after a finding that she had not engaged in strike misconduct.
One eyewitness for the employer was not introduced until rebuttal,
and the arbitrator ruled that his testimony should have been part of the
employer's "principal case." Accordingly, he refused to hear the witness. The reviewing court vacated the award and criticized the arbitrator's insistence on an orderly presentation of evidence. 1 5 The court
noted that the rules of the American Arbitration Association provide
flexibility in this regard by stating that "conformity to legal rules of
evidence shall not be necessary" in arbitral hearings. 6 ' The court explained that an arbitrator may, at his discretion, abide by legal rules
of evidence; however, since parties normally expect the proceedings to
be informal, such a decision should be communicated to the parties at
the outset of the hearings.' 67 The dispute was remanded to the same
arbitrator with orders that he admit the evidence and consider it in his
decision.
The conspicuous paucity of judicial vacations for procedural unfairness suggests that procedural error probably must be as clear as it was
in Harvey before a court will be willing to vacate the award.
Courts appear to be more willing to attack the validity of an award
on the basis of a finding that the arbitrator lacked the authority to have
heard the dispute in the first instance.YI s Since the collective agreement
is the sole source of an arbitrator's jurisdiction, any award which exceeds
the arbitrator's scope of authority has no legal basis or meaning. In
some instances, a limitation on the arbitrator's authority may be imposed by law. For example, where an arbitrator's interpretation of a
contract is conceptually correct it may still be objectionable if the
165. Id. at 495.

166. Id. at 491. The court here quoted from Rule 28 of the American Arbitration
Association. This and other problems are discussed in Aaron, Some ProceduralProblems
in Arbitration,10 VAND. L. REv. 739 (1957).
167. 263 F. Supp. at 492.

168. See, e.g., Local 425, Meat Cutters & Butchers Workmen v. Pluss Poultry, Inc.,
260 F.2d 835 (8th Cir. 1958); Central Packing Co. v. Local 36, United Packinghouse

Workers, 195 F. Supp. 188 (D. Kan. 1961); Local 721, United Packinghouse Workers v.
Needham Packing Co, 260 Iowa 908, 151 N.W.2d 540, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 830 (1967).

Note the conceptual difficulty involved in judicial vacation for lack of arbitrability.
When a court so vacates, it is contractually second-guessing an arbitrator on an issue the
arbitrator ostensibly is best equipped to decide. Nevertheless, vacation for want of
authority is not infrequent.
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contract inadvertently calls for the performance of an illegal act. In
these instances, the judiciary consistently has vacated the award in
greater importance than
order to protect those legal interests that are of 169
the enforcement of a single collective contract.
More typically, however, the only limitations imposed on an arbitrator
are the limitations which are imposed by the contract itself, as in Mag7
navox Co. of Tennessee v. InternationalUnion of Electrical Workers.'1
There, the employer discharged a worker who refused to perform assigned tasks because he felt the work would jeopardize his health. The
collective agreement which gave rise to arbitration provided that:
An arbitrator . . . shall not have the right to . . . consider, rule
or enter any award with respect to disciplinary action imposed
upon an employee for refusal or failure to perform assigned job
tasks, except where the employee can positively establish that the
performance of71 such task would have created a serious health
hazard to him.'
The arbitrator ruled that performance of the work assignment would
not have posed a serious health hazard to the employee. At that juncture in the proceedings, his authority to rule on the employee's discharge
was foreclosed by the plain terms of the contract; nevertheless, the
arbitrator proceeded to reinstate the employee. The court properly
72
vacated the reinstatement award for lack of arbitral jurisdictionY.
Although courts historically have been criticized for unwarranted
interference with the arbitral forum, 7 3 recent decisions illustrate the
judiciary's modern laissez-faire view toward labor arbitration. 7 4 Even
169. See, e.g., Hutchings v. United States Indus., Inc., 428 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1970),
where an arbitral award was vacated because it ordered violation of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. See also Glendale Mfg. Co. v. Local 520, ICGWU, 283 F.2d 936 (4th Cir.
1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 950 (1961), where the award commanded the performance
of an unfair labor practice.
170. 287 F. Supp. 47 (E.D. Tenn. 1968).
171. Id. at 49.
172. Id. at 52.
173. See, e.g., Syme, Arbitrability of Labor Disputes, 5 RuTGERS L. RIv. 591, 605
(1954); 6 SYRAcusE L. REv. 357 (1955).
174. Arbitration agreements should be broadly interpreted, and doubts as to arbitrability should be resolved in favor of coverage. Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Local
866, Teamsters, 447 F.2d 229 (2d Cir. 1971); Dean Truck Lines, Inc. v. Local 667,
Teamsters, 327 F. Supp. 1335 (D. Miss. 1971); Division 1205, -AFL-CIO v. Greyhound
Lines, Inc., 323 F. Supp. 219 (D. Mass. 1971).
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in Magnavox, where the award ultimately was vacated, the court initially recognized that:
[T]he court cannot inquire into the merits of the case in passing
on the correctness of the arbitrator's decision. . . [T]he employer and the Union are free to make the arbitration agreement
as broad or narrow as they choose and . . . the court should ordinarily refrain from interpreting the substantive provision of the
75
contract.

Conflicts
The differing perspectives from which courts and the Board view
arbitral awards may be illustrated by positing the following situation:
A grievance arises concerning unilateral wage changes instituted
by the employer. The Union files section 8 charges with the
Board and strikes, claiming unfair labor practice. The contract
includes a binding arbitration clause, and the Board defers to the
arbitral forum. At arbitration, ambiguous contract language is
interpreted as allowing the employer's action. Furthermore, the
arbitrator awards damages for lost production resulting from the
strike. The Union reinstitutes its complaint with the Board and
refuses to pay damages. At the same time the employer brings a
section 301 suit to enforce the arbitrator's award in federal or state
court.
As previously discussed, the court will apply only limited review in
determining the enforceability of the award. 176 This inquiry will be
limited generally to procedural fairness and the arbitrator's authority to
hear the dispute. 177 On the other hand, the Board will retain jurisdiction to review the arbitral decision under the Spielberg criteria. 178 The
apparent willingness of the Board to hear the facts de novo and to reverse fact determinations of the arbitrator, at least where clearly erroneous, renders the possibility of conflict on the viability of the award
patent.
The Supreme Court has stated that the mere possibility of inconsistent determinations by the Board and the courts is not sufficient
175. 287 F. Supp. at 49.
176. See notes 141-75 supra and accompanying text.
177. For a striking example of this tendency, see Hutchings v. United States Indus,
Inc., 428 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1970). But see Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d
324 (6th Cir. 1970).
178. See notes 124-40 supra and accompanying.text. -
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reason to oust the courts from their statutory duty of contract interpretation. 179 Lower federal courts, however, have decided that where
a conflict exists between a court decision enforcing an arbitral award,
and a Board decision on resolution of a section 10(k) jurisdictional
dispute, the Board decision should prevail." This result may be based
upon the statutory command to the Board affirmatively to resolve such
issues 8 ' and upon the supposed expertise of the Board in such matters.
Professor Jaffe suggests that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction loses
much of its force where jurisdictional overlaps are created by congres-2
sional enactments and where no specific regulated industry is involved.1
The adjudication of labor disputes arising under collective bargaining
agreements clearly exemplifies this situation, since Congress created the
overlap by enacting section 10 (a) of the NLRA and subsequently provided judicial review via section 301 of the LMRA. Additionally, labor
legislation seeks to regulate all industry rather than specific industries.
Thus, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction would be ineptly applied in
labor disputes.
The facts posited herein create a situation where administrative
machinery is not adequate to provide a remedy comparable to that which
is available in judicial proceedings. The Supreme Court has commented
on a similar problem in the following manner:
If it were clear that there was a remedy in this civil antitrust suit
that was not available in a § 411 proceeding before the CAB, we
would have the kind of problem presented in Hewitt-Robbins Inc.
v. Eastern Freight-Ways, Inc. . . .where litigation is held by a
court until the basic facts and findings are first determined by the
administrative agency, so that the judicial remedy, not available
83
in the other proceeding, can be granted.
Although applied in a different context, the Supreme Court's comment may offer a viable solution to the problems inherent in the posited
situation. However, such a process would surely be time-consuming,
179. Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
180. See NLRB v. Teamsters, Local 631, 403 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1968); Typographical
Union No. 17 v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1966).
181.29 US.C. S 160(k) (1970). See also NLRB v. Radio & Television Broadcast
Eng'rs, Local 212 [CBS], 364 U.S. 573 (1961).
182. L. JAF E, JuoicAL CoNTRoL oF ADMmINsrATiVE AcToN 124 (1965).
183. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296, 313 n.19 (1963).
See generally L. JAFFP, supra note 182, at 137-41.
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and time presumably is of the essence in furthering the primary policy
of the NLRA of promoting industrial peace.
It is submitted that the situation posited no longer requires the kind
of Board expertise that might have been indispensable in the early years
of labor legislation. A body of law interpreting section 8 has now developed that is available to the courts in determining the intent of Congress. Courts have demonstrated the ability to deal with section 8 violations in other contexts, and presumably judicial machinery could be
just as effective in this context. Thus, the courts might be better advised
to opt for judicial determinations of the enforceability of arbitral awards
and, "if the [NLRB] must be sounded, this whole costly merry-goround could be avoided by calling upon the [NLRB] to present its
views to the court." 18
CONCLVSION
The Board's decision in Collyer Insulated Wire surely removed the
anachronistic pre-arbitral-post-arbitral distinction introduced by decisions such as Beacon Piece Dyeing. However, in assessing the propriety of this development, it has been necessary to examine the mechanisms available to ensure rapid settlement of the disputes now putatively
the province of the arbitrator.
Historically, the Board has been reluctant to force unwilling parties
into arbitration. However, the Board has now evidenced a sustained intent to require parties to exhaust their agreed-upon procedures for private
dispute settlement.8 5 As a practical matter, the union strike weapon,
protected from injunction by the Norris-LaGuardia Act, might easily
have frustrated such a policy prior to the Supreme Court decision in
Boys Markets. Now, however, it appears that the anti-injunction provisions of Norris-LaGuardia will prevent injunctions against strikes in
violation of no-strike clauses in situations involving union animus.
A necessary corollary of the Board's broadened deferral policy will
be that greater numbers of unwilling parties will appear before the
arbitral forum. Consequently, arbitral award review and enforcement
mechanics will assume a greater role in industrial dispute settlement. It
is essential to the central purpose of national labor legislation-the promotion of industrial peace-that this machinery operate effectively and
smoothly. Currently there exist two forums for obtaining review of
arbitral awards-the Board and the courts. Since the standards of review
184. L. JMAFE, supranote 182, at 130.
185. See Corpus Engn'r Corp, 195 N.L.R.B. No. 113 (Feb. 28, 1972).
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supplied by the two forums differ measurably, the possibility of conflict is patent. Where such conflicts arise, they should be resolved by
granting judicial pre-emption in the area of contract enforcement. The
Board's opinions in such matters should be solicited and carefully considered, but not deemed controlling by the courts.
With the expansion of the Board's deferral policy, it also is appropriate to re-examine fundamental arguments favoring broad deferral. It
is generally argued that broadened deferral accomplishes at least six desirable objectives: (1) speedier resolution of labor disputes, wherein
time generally is of the essence; (2) reduction of the Board's burgeoning
caseload; (3) the positive effect upon labor relations that is presumed to
flow from internal settlement of disputes; (4) the integrity of collective
bargaining itself is better preserved by minimizing Board intervention;
(5) the expense of settlement is placed on the parties involved rather
than on the taxpayer who funds the processes of the Board; and (6)
the greater flexibility of the arbitral process, which typically is more
cognizant of special problems arising in particular industries and therefore better equipped to resolve some kinds of disputes in meaningful
manner.
Generally, it appears that the Collyer-Schlitz expansion of deferral is
compatible with this reasoning. It should be noted, however, that some
of the above-noted will not be realized to the extent commonly expected, since the Board has said that it intends to condition deferral on
the absence of animus. A finding of animus would seem to require
extensive Board screening of complaints. Such screening surely will
minimize the advantages of any expected caseload relief. Additionally,
the economic argument concerning proper allocation of costs is misleading. Although unions and employers certainly absorb the expense
of arbitration to a greater extent than they do in appearing before the
Board, it seems unreasonable to suppose that those expenses ultimately
are not passed on to the consuming public in one form or another.
Additionally, the above-noted advantages of arbitration must be
weighed against objections that will be raised. Of particular importance
is the effect of Collyer on small or impecunious labor organizations and
employers. It is perhaps for these groups that the notion of Board protection of public rights has particular meaning today. In the early years
of labor legislation, unions generally were unable to finance extensive
civil litigation for the protection of their rights. Thus, Board enforcement was essential to the integrity of sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA.
Now, labor unions have grown so that -their existence is no longer
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threatened by large expenditures for litigation. Small locals, however,
are still in the situation that prevailed at the outset of labor legislation in
1935. The devolution of the Board's role as protector of public rights
will hurt these unions most, since the cost of arbitration will often be
prohibitive for them.
Despite the fact that the advantages of continued deferral may not be
as significant as some commentators have hoped, it seems clear that the
problems faced by small locals probably must give way to the larger
interest of private settlement of labor disputes. It is also important to
note that the Board only recently was given the opportunity to fashion
a viable deferral policy vis-a-vis pre-award situation. Until Boys
Markets, pre-award deferral would have been meaningless if employers
had no remedy for union strikes. Now, strikes will be enjoined where
animus does not appear to be a factor in the dispute. The injunctive
power vested in the judiciary gives the Board new freedom to resolve
anachronistic distinctions such as appeared in Beacon Piece Dyeing.
In Collyer Insulated Wire, it appears that the Board intends to avail itself
of that freedom in a meaningful advancement of the preference for
arbitration previously expressed by both the legislature and the judiciary.

